New Delhi, Feb 2 (IANS): The recent visit of four high-ranking ISI officials, including Director General of Analysis Maj Gen Shahid Amin Afsar, to Dhaka on January 21 marks a significant shift in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. The two nations, historically estranged since the brutal 1971 Liberation War—wherein Pakistani forces are accused of massacring nearly three million people and violating 2,00,000 Bengali women—are now demonstrating signs of rapprochement. The evolving diplomatic landscape comes in the wake of Bangladesh's political turmoil, following the abrupt removal of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, triggered by a student-led mass uprising. Her ousting has upended regional power equations, particularly unsettling India, which had long maintained a strong strategic partnership with Hasina’s government. The burgeoning Pakistan-Bangladesh engagement now presents a challenge to India’s regional influence.
Just days before the ISI delegation’s arrival in Dhaka, a Bangladeshi military delegation led by Lt Gen SM Kamrul Hasan, the Principal Staff Officer of the Armed Forces Division, visited Rawalpindi—the nerve centre of Pakistan’s military establishment—from January 13 to 18. The delegation met the chiefs of the Pakistani army, navy, and air force, highlighting a deepening military dialogue. The Pakistani military’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), characterised the two nations as “brotherly,” underscoring their resilience against “external influences.” This statement is a clear indication that Pakistan views its growing ties with Bangladesh as a strategic counterbalance in the region, an aspect that would not sit well with New Delhi.
Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, has already taken key steps towards fostering better ties with Pakistan. In November 2024, a historic direct maritime link between Karachi and Chittagong was inaugurated—the first since Bangladesh’s independence. Previously, Pakistani goods had to be rerouted through third-party ports in Sri Lanka, Singapore, or Malaysia, causing logistical delays and increased costs. Another major step came in September 2024 when Bangladesh scrapped the 100 per cent mandatory physical inspection of goods imported from Pakistan, citing its negative impact on trade efficiency. These measures signal a strong intent from both sides to enhance commercial ties, which have traditionally remained modest.
On the diplomatic front, interactions between the top leadership of both countries have been frequent and purposeful. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus on two notable occasions—first at the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2024, and again during the D-8 summit in Cairo in December. Both leaders expressed expanding economic collaboration, cultural exchanges, and strategies to tackle the dengue crisis, which has been a pressing health concern in both nations. Yunus also pushed for the resolution of longstanding issues stemming from the 1971 war, emphasising that they need to settle “once and for all, for future generations.” Shehbaz Sharif, in response, assured that Pakistan would explore ways to address these historical disputes.
From India’s perspective, the newfound warmth between Pakistan and Bangladesh raises concerns. Bangladesh has been India’s closest ally in South Asia, sharing deep economic ties—being India’s largest trading partner in the region—and playing a crucial role in regional security. Given its proximity to India’s northeastern states, Bangladesh’s cooperation has been critical in controlling insurgencies. During the 1990s and 2000s, several anti-India militant groups found sanctuary in Bangladesh, using its porous 4,000-km border to smuggle arms and recruit insurgents. Sheikh Hasina’s government had significantly cracked down on these elements, earning India’s trust and solidifying bilateral relations. Under Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh and India also resolved key disputes amicably, including the 2014 maritime boundary settlement and the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement.
With Hasina’s departure, however, India finds itself in a precarious position. The possibility of Bangladesh drifting towards a more independent foreign policy—one that includes rekindling ties with Pakistan—could have strategic implications. The expected visit of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar to Dhaka next month, the first since 2012, will likely be viewed with unease in New Delhi. However, despite the changing diplomatic tides, Bangladesh remains heavily dependent on India for trade, energy, and security cooperation. Given its current political instability and economic fragility, Dhaka is unlikely to risk alienating New Delhi completely.
In light of these developments, it appears that Bangladesh is cautiously recalibrating its foreign policy approach. Rather than choosing an outright alignment with Pakistan, it is likely seeking to diversify its diplomatic and trade engagements. The narrative from Dhaka suggests that it seeks to move past historical animosities and foster pragmatic relations with Islamabad, while still maintaining its strategic partnership with India. For India, this means a diplomatic challenge—ensuring that Bangladesh remains within its sphere of influence while preventing an overt shift towards Pakistan.
The geopolitical shifts in South Asia are unfolding rapidly, and Bangladesh finds itself at the heart of this evolving dynamic. While it may seek to mend fences with Pakistan, the economic, historical, and security-driven ties with India are too entrenched to be severed overnight. Thus, despite the growing engagements between Dhaka and Islamabad, Bangladesh will likely tread cautiously, ensuring that it does not upset the regional balance while advancing its national interests.