Panaji, Dec 19 (IANS): Goan history “accounts for over 40 rebellions against Portuguese rule”. In 1946, 14 Goan leaders were deported to Portugal and Angola. “Between February 1954 and May 1955, about 3,000 Goans have been arrested and over a thousand Goans imprisoned, some without trial, besides some thousands who have been taken to police stations and beaten on mere suspicion such as the possession of Mahatma Gandhi’s or Jawaharlal Nehru’s photos.

"This is no small evidence of our determination to reunite with India” were the words of H.C. Denis, Chairman of the Goan League in England, in a letter to the “Manchester Guardian”.

For backstage diplomacy between India and Portugal, India’s UN delegation chief and a personal friend of then Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Belthi Shah Gilani, visited Lisbon in October 1955 to find a solution to Goa.

In November 1955, during a visit by Soviet leaders to Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru discussed the Soviet veto blocking 18 countries from joining the UN.

As a goodwill gesture, Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev agreed to most entries, excluding Mongolia and Japan. Portugal, supported by India, joined the UN, reflecting a shift in India's earlier policy.

However, soon after its admission on December 22, 1955, Portugal approached the International Court of Justice, accusing India of blocking its troops from reaching Dadra and Nagar Haveli.

By mid-1961, frustrated with Prime Minister Salazar's intransigence, Nehru lost patience. By late August 1961, India’s defence authorities had been given to understand that military action against the Portuguese held territories was a distinct possibility. Lt. General J.N. Chaudhari prepared a deployment plan for ground, air, and naval forces after surveying the Goa border.

In November 1961, after Indian ships and fishing boats were fired upon near the Anjadiv Island, the decision to respond militarily became increasingly urgent. Initially, the government's reaction appeared focused solely on Anjadiv Island, as indicated by a warning order dated 29 November.

This order stated: "In response to recent Portuguese aggression against Indian nationals, the government plans to undertake specific actions in the Anjadiv Island area. Portuguese retaliation may necessitate armed action against their territories in India."

However, a detailed assessment by the armed forces revealed that limiting operations to Anjadiv would yield little strategic benefit. Consequently, the plan was expanded to include all Portuguese colonies in India.

In early December 1961, just weeks before India's military action in Goa, Portugal proposed an international mission to investigate border incidents. India ignored this suggestion, reiterating its hope that Portugal would evacuate its colonies. Initially, the operation was planned for 16 December but was delayed to 18 December, likely due to diplomatic efforts at the UN and Nehru's preference for a peaceful resolution.

Between 4 and 11 December, Indian authorities reported multiple border violations by Portuguese patrols, including gunfire and a house search. Protest notes were sent, while Portugal accused India of similar acts, including overflights and attacks on a Goan village.

Despite these tensions, Portugal refrained from retaliation but invited international observers to assess the situation. On December 11, Nehru told the Rajya Sabha that India's patience had run out due to repeated Portuguese provocations.

On December 12, the Governor General Vassalo e Silva ordered the evacuation of European women and children of the Portuguese officials and military personnel, which was done by air and sea in the next few days.

However when everything seemed lost, Salazar sent a dramatic telegram dated December 14, 1961, to the Governor General on the eve of the attack by the Indian army, asking a sacrificio total or total sacrifice, meaning that his soldiers and sailors either end up victorious or dead in the defence of the realm.

Salazar had also commanded him to burn and destroy Goa before surrendering it to the Indian Army, but the Governor General could not fulfill those orders, for which he suffered punishment from the unforgiving dictator back home.

Operation Vijay was launched before Prime Minister Nehru had second thoughts about calling it off and the Indian army entered Goa on 18th December from the South of Goa. Major General K.P. Candeth, GOC, 17th infantry division directed the operations against Goa.

There was hardly any opposition from the Portuguese whose troops were captured without any violence. On the eastern and northern front, there was little resistance with the Portuguese firing some shots before withdrawing.

The operation order dated 11th December directed the 17 Infantry Division and attached troops to swiftly advance into Goa to capture Panjim and Marmugao through a multi-pronged strategy: thrusts from the east and north, and a diversionary entry from the south.

A small force entered Goa from the south at 6 a.m. on 18th December, encountering minimal resistance at Ardifond before advancing to Margao by the morning of the 19th, securing the southern half of Goa without any casualties.

On the eastern and northern fronts, resistance was limited to sporadic gunfire as Portuguese forces relied on delaying tactics, including demolishing bridges, laying mines, and setting up roadblocks.

The Portuguese strategy aimed to hold Indian forces long enough—at least eight days—to secure international intervention via a UN resolution. Salazar's instructions emphasized a no-surrender stance, envisioning either victory or complete destruction.

Indian forces, aware of these plans, countered by aiming to complete the operation within three days. Superior strength and efficient engineering units were deployed to repair bridges simultaneously, ensuring swift progress.

On realizing the futility of resistance, the Portuguese avoided major confrontations, focusing instead on sabotaging infrastructure.

This lack of determined opposition allowed Indian forces to liberate Goa in just one and a half days, far quicker than anticipated.

The Portuguese forces in Daman and Diu offered significant resistance compared to Goa. In Daman, troops adhered to orders to "fight to the last man and last round," resulting in fierce clashes. Communication with Goa was severed on the morning of 18th December, leaving Daman and Diu without further instructions from Goa or Lisbon.

The conflict in Daman caused 4 Indian fatalities and 14 injuries, while Portuguese casualties included 10 deaths and 2 injuries.

In Diu, resistance was similarly intense, leading to 8 Indian deaths and 17 injuries. In Goa, where resistance was weaker, Indian casualties were 3 killed and 4 injured, while Portuguese forces suffered 13 deaths and 10 injuries.

By the evening of 19th December 1961, all operations concluded, and the Portuguese Governor General, Manuel António Vassalo e Silva, signed the unconditional surrender documents in Vasco da Gama, Goa.

(The writer is an author and columnist. Her latest book is Blood In The Sea: The Dark History of Hindu Oppression In Goa)